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Automation that & appropriate for application in realistically complex 
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Almtrad--Automation technology, including digital compu- 
ter and communication techniques, is being applied in an 
ever-increasing range of private and public spheres, and 
reaching third world cultures not previously exposed to such 
technology. It is engineers' responsibility to consider the 
direct and indirect effects of this technology. To be able to 
fulfill this responsibility and make proper design decisions, 
engineers must both understand "appropriateness" within a 
given boundary, and have decision authority, together with 
other parties participating in the design. Whereas sound 
methodologies for user-centered esign are appearing, 
anticipating and considering the cultural effects of automa- 
tion are concerns that go far beyond traditional engineering. 
Nevertheless, engineers hould be more deeply involved in 
comprehensive technology assessment. Encouraging ex- 
periences show how innovative design approaches and 
consideration of comprehensive s ts of requirements can lead 
to better overall system performance. However, much 
research on open questions remains to be done. 
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INTRODUCTION 
MODZRN TECHNOLOGY involves the application of 
science in societal contexts. Automation 
technology, including digital computers and 
communication techniques which have become 
such vital elements and tools of automation, is
an ever-growing technology with an enormous 
range of subjects and applications. Its applica- 
tions range from single-machine automation, 
through the control of industrial processes, up to 
computerized administrative processes, and use 
in military installations. New applications are 
continuously being developed, including in areas 
not earlier foreseen--for example, in third 
world cultures not previously exposed to such 
technology. 
This enormous versatility has been achieved 
because the methods of automatic ontrol and 
computer science involve a high degree of 
abstraction, particularly in terms of formalized 
models. Engineers developing such models tend 
not to be primarily concerned with the social or 
other consequences of their subjects. However, 
as technological implementation becomes more 
application-oriented, consideration of the effects 
caused by automation technology becomes more 
important. The question is when and how to 
consider such effects in the design and 
implementation process. 
In another IFAC Congress plenary paper, 
Sheridan et al. (1983) raised the issue of 
adapting automation to man, culture and 
society. In their paper, they treated general 
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issues of automation and discussed the proper 
extent of automation by scaling "degrees of 
assistance" that a computerized system might 
provide in supervisory control. In our paper, we 
will discuss criteria for appropriateness of 
automation, and stress issues of design and 
design methodology. The design considerations 
will be illustrated by lessons learned from case 
studies in both process and manufacturing 
industries. We will also consider cultural issues 
related to automation. Thinking of automation 
from a global perspective, we as engineers can 
no longer be indifferent to the effects of 
automation technology on those countries which 
have neither the political drive and education to 
utilize this technology appropriately for their 
economic and cultural benefit, nor the power or 
insight to prevent the negative effects of 
automation technology exported to them by the 
developed countries. 
OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS OF APPROPRIATE 
AUTOMATION 
As in any other technical field, automation 
technology must meet a given set of require- 
ments to justify its application. These include as 
a minimum the criteria of adequacy of the means 
(and funds) employed, and acceptability of the 
elaborated technical solution. Automation faces 
particular difficulties in measuring up to such 
requirements, often because of the interdiscipli- 
nary nature of the problems to be solved. Many 
products of engineering, such as electronic hips 
or fuel cells, have a technical environment only. 
But automation systems, methods, and tech- 
niques also have to function in a human 
environment. The working population con- 
cerned must be actively integrated in the 
modeling of work processes if an automated 
system is to be accepted. This requires precise 
determination of the necessary interactions in 
the division of labor between human and 
machine. Consequently, the large variety of user 
interfaces (and their design considerations) has 
become one of the focal points in automation 
technology (as will be outlined below in 
discussions of human-centered design). 
Human-machine incomparability 
The rapid and broad successes of automation 
technology have given rise to the hope that it is a 
panacea for solving complex problems. This 
hope is especially entrenched in the minds of 
many decision-makers, partly as a consequence 
of public relations activities and the universal 
tendency for successes to be more widely 
publicized than failures. Nevertheless, many 
automation projects have failed due to 
insufficient automatability, inadequate user- 
system interfaces, and incompatibility between 
human needs and system requirements. 
With the advent of "expert systems" as a new 
paradigm of programming computer-based con- 
trol systems, large parts of the artificial 
intelligence (AI) establishment have assumed, 
and subsequently announced, that such systems 
will possess almost incredible capabilities for 
solving complex tasks. Although formulation of 
ill-defined problems by statements of facts and 
rules, and heuristic searching for solutions, will 
in many cases be more successful than 
conventional programming, even these systems 
can only provide partial solutions. The hope that 
such systems may render superfluous the 
responsible valuation of results by people is a 
dangerous fallacy, as expert systems are 
designed to admit uncertain results without hese 
always being recognizable as such (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1986). Reminding ourselves of acci- 
dents that have shaken the public globally in 
recent years, such as Chernobyl in 1986, the 
stock exchange crash of 1987 and the Iran Air 
airbus downing in the Gulf in 1988, should give 
reasons enough to rethink our belief in the 
proper role of automation. 
Kurt Goedel (1962) showed that in any formal 
system there always exists nondecidable proposi- 
tions which cannot be proven by means of the 
formal system itself (Goedel's Incompleteness 
Theorem). An additional problem arises from 
the fact that the meaning of symbols is normally 
context-dependent and, therefore, cannot be 
formally described in principle. From this it 
follows that a computer-aided vision and pattern 
recognition system cannot recognize an object 
for certain. Therefore in the case of the airbus 
downing, when the radar system on board the 
USS Vincennes recognized an unidentified, 
assumed enemy aircraft, the order to shoot 
should not have been given. The official version 
for the predominant cause of the accident was 
"human failure". This judgement ignores the 
fact that the ship's hyper-instrumentation led to 
a complexity that the persons in charge could no 
longer cope with under stressful conditions 
(Klein, 1989). The belief in technology, having 
found its universal symbol in the computer, has 
itself become a risk factor (Perrow, 1984). False 
belief in automation i this case left 290 persons 
dead. 
Completely automated systems based on 
heuristic processes are extremely problematic, 
for heuristic processes intrinsically can include 
wrong solutions. In situations where surprises 
can lead to critical situations and matters of life 
and death, responsible decisions cannot be left 
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to such systems alone. Instead, final decisions 
must be left to people, because people have the 
ability to deal with unfamiliar and unexpected 
situations. 
The unique abilities of humans, in contrast o 
artefacts such as control systems and computers, 
have been studied by psychologists. Recent 
observations reveal that skills based on empirical 
knowledge, such as a feeling for machines and 
materials, continue to play an important part in 
the work with computer-controlled machines 
(B6hle and Milkau, 1988). In dealing with AI 
techniques for automation purposes, we should 
abandon the idea of human-computer com- 
parability and pursue instead the concept of 
complementarity. Otherwise, there is a great 
danger that, for example, the potential of expert 
systems will continue to be overestimated. This 
danger could result in expert systems not 
primarily being adapted to cope with the 
complexity of reality, but reality being reduced 
to that which can be formalized and fitted into 
expert systems (Moldaschl, 1989). 
Responsibility ofengineers 
As outlined above, it is vital to determine 
where full or even partial automation cannot or 
should not be used, and where computer-aided 
operations, for instance, might be appropriate 
instead. It needs to be emphasized that decisions 
and actions in important technical, social, 
economic, and military problem areas must be 
handled not by automated systems and compu- 
ters, but through the responsible actions of 
people. 
For a person to be able to carry responsibility, 
two prerequisites must be fulfilled. The person 
needs the knowledge and skills to master the 
situation, i.e. to interpret and act in an 
appropriate manner; and he/she must possess 
the proper authority and latitude of decision- 
making and action. 
For control engineers, this means that they 
must be knowledgeable about social and other 
nontechnical effects of automation. The IFAC 
Committee on Social Effects of Automation 
works to disseminate available knowledge. 
Unfortunately, in most technical schools and 
universities, subjects like work science, social 
effects of technology, and human-machine 
systems are not compulsory in engineering 
curricula. Necessary knowledge, therefore, is not 
readily available. Another problem can be that 
engineers, although attempting to keep them- 
selves informed, do not know about all effects of 
their products, e.g. the cultural effects in 
countries to which the products are exported. 
The second precondition is also problematic. 
Engineers designing products are situated within 
certain boundaries beyond which they exert little 
influence. While engineers may be able to design 
proper human-machine interfaces which con- 
sider the human-related effects in the 
workplace, engineers are often unable to 
influence environmental effects or to prevent 
export of products to countries where they will 
cause negative cultural effects. To consider 
responsibility we must, therefore, first define the 
boundaries within which the effects of automa- 
tion can be considered. 
Such problems should not, however, be an 
excuse for engineers to avoid active involvement 
in questions of the effects of automation. 
Engineers should come to grips with human, 
social, economic and cultural consequences of
their products. This involvement can range from 
actively including relevant requirements in the 
design process, to refusal to cooperate in 
projects with visible negative ffects which are 
not usually taken into account. 
CRITERIA FOR APPROPRIATENESS OF 
AUTOMATION 
Possible criteria and problem attributes to be 
considered for a given automation effort are 
manifold. Table 1 shows a possible way of 
structuring various issues. 
In order to integrate these considerations into 
system planning and design, one must under- 
stand them in terms of causes and effects, 
dependencies and contradictions, and short- and 
long-term effects. Integration is, therefore, a 
question of balancing different values. This will, 
in real life, be a bargaining process taking place 
at different levels; those of company, country or 
international community. In the following, we 
will treat many, but not all, of the issues in Table 
1--for example, environmental issues cannot be 
considered in this paper. 
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF AUTOMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
The social relevance of automation technology 
is pronounced. It primarily deals with the (re) 
organization of work processes. In the design of 
automated systems, this focus on work 
processes becomes important in determining the 
relationships between humans and machines. 
Machines, therefore, must always be defined in 
relation to the subjects of the work--humans. 
Even fully-automated systems are in no way 
autonomous: they also relate to real patterns of 
work and life. Consequently, people are, again, 
the subjects of these processes. 
Due to progressive divisions of labor, 
technical and administrative design strategies 
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TABLE 1. STRUCTURE OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF AUTOMATION 
Subject Actors and "victims" Scientific field Goals and values 
Automation system Automation/control 
design engineers 
Human interface design Ergonomists, system 
users 
Job and work organiza- Personnel dept, man- 
tion design agement, workers 
Coordination within the Top management, en-
enterprise terprise departments 
Interenterprise Enterprises, customers 
cooperation 
Society Politicians, general 
public 
Developed and de- 
veloping countries 
Humankind, biosphere 
Intersociety effects 
World 
Automation/control 
technology 
Human factors; 
ergonomics 
Organization science 
Organization science, 
information systems 
Micro-economics, 
computer networks 
Macro-economics, 
Development 
economics 
Ecology, geophysics 
Reliability, robustness, 
accuracy, flexibility 
User-friendliness, 
efficiency 
Job satisfaction, labor 
productivity 
Flexibility, service, profit 
Mutual benefits 
Economic growth, 
employment 
Quality of life 
Preservation f nature 
have evolved and become accepted in which 
humans are considered to be potential nuisances 
with high error probabilities. Consequently, 
humans are often kept out of immediate work 
process as much as possible. Such a strategy 
leads to the danger that automated systems no 
longer serve supporting functions, but instead 
become dominating factors. 
Demoting the working population from 
subjects of their work to machine operators kills 
the willingness and ability to act in responsible 
ways. The subsequent deskilling of the work- 
force has been proven and documented by 
empirical data. The IFAC Committee on Social 
Effects of Automation has helped to disseminate 
this knowledge, and has also played a central 
role in developing and discussing methods for 
proper design of work practices in automated 
systems (Bibby et al., 1976; Rijnsdorp, 1978; 
Martin, 1984; Br6dner, 1987). In this vein, Jones 
created the notion of the "computer-aided 
craftsman", suggesting that automation technol- 
ogy should be carefully designed around skilled 
human work (Jones, 1984). 
Sociologists are currently talking about a 
change of paradigm in industrial automation 
(Martin, 1988). The organization and division of 
labor, the question of which functions to 
automate and which not, qualification require- 
ments and appropriate personnel structures 
should not be parameters determined by 
developments in automation technology. They 
must be regarded as strategic variables to be 
used deliberately by decision-makers. 
General guidelines for development 
One suggestion as a general guideline for 
designing automated systems is that such systems 
be viewed from two points of view, namely that 
of social relevance and that of the tool character 
(R6diger, 1988). Since we are concerned with 
single machines as well as networked informa- 
tion systems, the notion of a "tool" must be seen 
in a broad sense. 
The importance of the tool character is 
neglected in systems development if people are 
considered simply as information-processing 
systems. The holistic, intuitive abilities of people 
need opportunities to establish and attain goals 
independently and to acqurie an overview of 
work processes. This, in turn, requires latitude 
of action. It further requires that opportunities 
for communicative action be created and 
maintained, in order to enable discussions and 
cooperation with other people to take place. 
For individual designers involved in product or 
system development, he question arises of how 
to combine the guidelines outlined above with 
the criteria and the conditions imposed by 
clients. In this respect, a dialogue between 
developers and users is of the greatest 
importance in the interest of achieving these 
goals. 
The need to optimize both technical and 
human factors suggests a parallel design 
approach wherein both aspects are considered 
side by side throughout he design process, to 
achieve overall optimization of the system. A 
possible scheme, shown in Fig. 1, was 
developed within a project funded under the 
auspices of the ESPRIT Programme. This 
project dealt with the design of a flexible 
assembly cell (Ravden et al., 1986). It was 
necessary to determine which criteria were 
relevant at which stages in the design process. 
This suggested a hierarchical structuring of the 
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FIG. 1. Human factors mapped onto a model of the design 
process. 
criteria, although in practice design is an 
iterative, cyclic process. Some of the human 
aspects considered were: 
Allocation of functions. This addresses the 
methods by which functions (or tasks) within the 
system are allocated between humans and 
machines, stressing, for example, human- 
machine complementarity. 
Job design. By advocating factors such as 
autonomy, responsibility, variety, etc., this area 
concentrates on ensuring that the human 
functions allocated above are designed to 
maximize flexibility responsiveness, and motiva- 
tion of those operating, supporting and manag- 
ing the system. 
Organizational structure. This is possibly the 
most difficult area to integrate into the design 
process model. Organizational factors such as 
self-supervision, minimal functional specializa- 
tion, etc., are included with the overall aim of 
providing a supportive organizational structure. 
Whereas aims to maximize flexibility and 
minimize functional specialization seem to be 
prevailing both in the process and manufacturing 
industries today--as illustrated in the ex- 
periences in both industries discussed in later 
sections--other demands on organizations by 
different environments can also come into the 
play. In general, existing organizations tend to 
view new technologies within the framework of 
existing work designs which may be inappropri- 
ate for operating these technologies. Cummings 
and Blumberg (1987) describe technical, per- 
sonal and environmental contingencies that 
determine the kinds of work design that are 
likely to be most successful. They found from 
case analyses, for example, that new manufac- 
turing processes place increasing demands on 
employees to manage unforeseen and non- 
routine situations. They conclude that this calls 
for self-regulating work groups, a conclusion also 
reached by our own experiences and discussed in 
later sections. 
HUMANIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY VERSUS 
HUMAN ENGINEERING 
An interesting discussion has been taking 
place within IFAC in recent years. The question 
of interest is, "Are 'humanization of technology' 
and 'human engineering' for efficiency and 
productivity conflicting objectives, or can they 
support each other?" 
At the IFAC Congress in Budapest in 1984, 
Tom Sheridan performed a delphi study with 
twenty experts from the IFAC Committee on 
Social Effects of Automation (SOCEFF) and the 
Man-Machine Systems Working Group (MMS) 
of the Systems Engineering Committee 
(SECOM). The subject of the delphi study was 
to find out how these experts differed in their 
views on creating good working conditions for 
operations in industry. At the next Congress in 
Munich in 1987, Jan Forslin interpreted the 
results (M~irtensson, 1987). 
The basic issues and the differing views are 
shown in Fig. 2, indicating how each group 
views each topic in the center column. 
Apparently, there is an underlying psychological 
dimension that explains the different opinions. 
The ensuing discussion illustrated the changing 
nature of this dichotomy. As the field of 
human-machine systems design becomes more 
mature and integrated, more people seem able 
to combine valuative and analytical approaches. 
Consequently, designs become objectives-driven 
instead of technology-driven. 
There is a need for integration of both 
perspectives to achieve a common design 
approach. One model for this may be the layers 
of design shown in Fig. 3, based on the 
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sociotechnical systems design approach (Martin 
et al., 1987). The approach starts by designing 
the overall sociotechnical structure, trying to 
anticipate the social effects of the technology 
used. The approach then works further "from 
outside in", with the design of proper hardware 
and software at the end. A complementary 
approach is provided by the emerging concept of 
human-centered design. 
HUMAN-CENTERED ISSUES OF DESIGN 
As illustrated in earlier discussions, the design 
of human-machine systems is particularly 
difficult (and challenging) when the context is 
large-scale systems. This difficulty is due to the 
complexity of such contexts, although this 
assertion is certainly not a great insight. The 
human-centered design issues of concern do not 
involve complexity in general--they involve the 
consequences of complexity (Rouse, 1988a, 
1991). 
One of these issues involves the nature of 
decision-making situations faced by humans in 
large-scale systems. There are basically three 
types of decision-making situations: familiar and 
frequent, familiar and infrequent and unfamiliar 
and infrequent. 
We are usually pretty good at dealing with 
the familiar and frequent--we know these 
situations are going to arise, and they happen 
often enough to justify investing in means of 
dealing with them. 
Familiar and infrequent situations are the grist 
for the risk analyst's mill. How infrequent? What 
are likely consequences and their costs? Answers 
to these questions determine our investment 
strategies for dealing with these risks. 
Unfamiliar and infrequent situations pose a 
dilemma. On the one hand, perhaps we should 
invest in making the unfamiliar familiar. Then, 
it's back to risk analysis. On the other hand, 
such a strategy ignores the inevitability of 
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humans eventually having to deal with the 
unfamiliar--not knowing what has happened or 
what to do about it. The nonlinear, distributed 
nature of large-scale systems will result in a 
larger number and wider variety of unfamiliar 
situations. We need to be able to design for 
decision making in this type of situation. 
A second issue concerns the nature of 
emerging large-scale systems which, as noted 
earlier, is resulting in higher-order effects being 
increasingly salient. Thus, for example, events in 
one sector of the transportation system can affect 
operations in another sector. Within the 
economy in general, industries affect each other 
in more far-reaching ways than in the past. 
Looking more broadly, economic development 
efforts can negatively affect the environment on 
a global scale. Technological development can 
profoundly affect educational requirements-- 
and, as later illustrated, suffer due to educational 
shortfalls or misdirection. 
The result of these higher-order effects is that 
there are a larger number and wider variety of 
stakeholders in particular decision-making situa- 
tions. Consequently, decision-makers are pulled 
in all directions, decisions are made to minimize 
political risks, or decisions are avoided. 
A third issue concerns the role of humans in 
large-scale systems. There are two primary 
reasons why humans are included as operators, 
maintainers and managers in complex systems. 
One reason is people's ability to perform--to 
exercise skills, judgment and creativity. Some 
pundits argue that intelligent computers will 
soon eliminate the need for humans to perform 
in these ways. This assessment appears to be 
somewhat reasonable for manipulative skills, 
occasionally on target for judgemental abilities, 
and substantially off the mark for creativity. 
Even if the soothsayers are right, perhaps later 
rather than sooner, the second motivation for 
humans having roles in complex systems is 
seldom, if ever, addressed by new technology. 
Humans are included in complex systems to be 
responsible for system operations and perfor- 
mance. The ability to accept responsibility and, 
if required, to find innovative ways to fulfill 
these responsibilities is a uniquely human 
characteristic. This is particularly evident when 
things go wrong, sometimes unpredictably and 
uncontrollably, and some individual or group 
accepts responsibility and initiates efforts to set 
things right again. 
We raise the issue of responsibility because we 
are concerned that the complexity and technol- 
ogy associated with large-scale systems will lead 
the people involved to lose their feelings of 
responsibility--to perceive that "the system's in 
charge". If this happens, then in fact no one will 
be in charge. This possibility leads to the topic of 
design philosophy. 
Choosing a design philosophy involves select- 
ing objectives at their highest, value-laden 
levels. From this perspective, it is important hat 
design objectives involve developing the means 
whereby people in complex systems can achieve 
the operational objectives for which they are 
responsible (Rouse, 1991). Thus, the purpose of 
the people in the system is not to "staff" the 
system--the purpose of the system is to support 
the people in achieving their objectives. In other 
words, an "appropriate" design philosophy is 
simply that people are in charge. Based on this 
philosophy, the question of whether or not they 
should be in charge is not a technical issue. The 
key question is how to support hem so that they 
can be in charge successfully. More specific 
questions concern where in systems people 
should be; how they should be trained and 
aided; and how we can assure that they accept 
and retain feeling of being responsible. 
Adoption of the above design philosophy, as 
well as the consequent design objective, leads to 
three primary design goals. These goals involve 
developing means for: 
Helping people overcome their limitations 
(e.g. human error) 
Helping people enhance their abilities (e.g. 
pattern recognition) and 
Fostering user acceptance (e.g. avoiding the 
"not invented here" attitude). 
HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
A suitable design philosophy and design goals 
are necessary for appropriate automation; 
however, they are not sufficient. A design 
methodology is needed that enables designers to 
achieve goals in a manner consistent with the 
philosophy. 
The determination of human-centered func- 
tional requirements for large-scale systems is 
difficult to do well. Balancing what users 
apparently want with what they may need, as 
well as balancing technological and economic 
realities, can prove to be far from straightfor- 
ward. It is fairly common to discover that the 
"final" requirements are incomplete and incon- 
sistent. Obviously, it is better to discover this 
early rather than late. 
We have found that a structured methodology 
can ease the burden of requirements analysis, as 
well as provide insights that might not otherwise 
be gained (Rouse, 1987; Rouse and Cody, 1989; 
Rouse, 1991). This methodology is based on the 
notion that the seven measurement issues shown 
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in Fig. 4 are central to successful system design. 
If these issues are not addressed by system 
designers, they will eventually be addressed by 
system users, with perhaps unfortunate 
implications for sales, liability claims, etc. 
The list of questions in Fig. 4 is used in two 
ways. Measurements are executed bottom 
up---the system has to run, compute, etc. prior 
to measuring actual sales. In contrast, measure- 
ments are planned top down. Thus, the eventual 
measurement of viability, acceptability, and 
validity should be planned long before testing is 
considered. 
From this perspective, there are two classes of 
problem that can arise. The first is planning too 
late, where, for example, failure to plan for 
assessing acceptance can preclude measurement 
prior to putting a product or system into use. 
The second is execution too early where, for 
instance, demonstrations are executed prior to 
resolving test and verification issues, and can 
potentially lead to negative initial impressions of 
a product or system. 
The measurement issues listed in Fig. 4 
encompass a fairly diverse set of questions. If 
each of these issues were pursued independently, 
as if they were ends in themselves, the costs of 
measurement would be prohibitive. Yet each 
issue is important and should not be neglected. 
What is needed, therefore, is an overall 
approach to measurement that balances the 
allocation of resources among the issues, while 
also integrating intermediate measurement 
results in a way that provides maximal benefit o 
the evolution of the design product. We have 
found that this can be accomplished by viewing 
measurement as a process involving four phases: 
(1) naturalist, (2) marketing, (3) engineering, 
and (4) sales and service (Rouse, 1991). 
The naturalist phase involves understanding 
the domain and tasks of users, from the 
perspectives of individuals, the organization, and 
the environment. This understanding includes 
Viability 
Acceptance 
Validation = 
Evaluation = 
Demonstration 
Verification = 
Testing = 
Are the benefits of system use 
sufficiently greater than its costs? 
Do organizations / individuals use 
the system? 
Does the system solve the problem? 
Does the system meet requirements? 
How do observers react to the system? 
Is the system put together as planned? 
Does the system run, compute, etc? 
FIG. 4. Measurement issues. 
not only the users' activities but also prevalent 
values and attitudes relative to productivity, 
technology, and change in general. Concerns of 
particular interest include identification of 
difficult and easy aspects of tasks, barriers to 
and potential avenues of improvement, and the 
relative leverage of various stakeholders in the 
organization. The results of the naturalist phase 
include a characterization f users' tasks and 
needs, as well as users' perceptions of how these 
needs might be met. 
This characterization f users and needs erves 
as input to the marketing phase. With this 
understanding, one is in a position to concep- 
tualize alternative products and systems to 
support users. These product concepts are used 
for initial marketing to obtain users' reactions 
relative to validity, acceptability, and viability. 
In other words, one wants to determine whether 
or not users perceive a product or system 
concept as solving an important problem, solving 
it in an acceptable way, and solving it at a 
reasonable cost. 
While one cannot resolve all of the validity, 
acceptability and viability questions during the 
marketing phase, one can test and elaborate the 
plans for eventual resolution of these issues. 
Further, one can test and refine the hypotheses 
that have emerged from the naturalist phase 
regarding the appropriate impact of user 
characteristics on design choices and product 
concepts. Thus, the marketing phase produces 
both an assessment of the relative merits of the 
multiple product concepts that have emerged up 
to this point, and a preview of any particular 
difficulties that are likely when one later tries to 
ensure that users perceive the resulting product 
as valid, acceptable and viable. 
The engineering phase begins with tradeoffs 
between desired conceptual functionality and 
technological reality. Technology development 
will usually have been pursued prior to and in 
parallel with the naturalist and marketing 
phases. This will have at least partially ensured 
that the product concepts shown to potential 
users during the marketing phase were not 
technologically or economically ridiculous. 
However, one must now be very specific about 
how desired functionality is to be provided, what 
performance is possible, and the resources 
necessary to provide it. Most of the effort in this 
phase is associated with using various formal and 
informal design methodologies to transform 
conceptual designs to detailed design. Measure- 
ment concerns include both planning and 
execution of evaluation, demonstration, verifica- 
tion, and testing. 
The sales and service phase begins once these 
Appropriate automation i complex sociotechnical domains 909 
four issues have been successfully resolved. The 
focus now shifts to validity, acceptability and 
viability. At this point, one ensures that 
implementation conditions are consistent with 
the assumptions underlying the design basis of 
the product. 
If the naturalist and marketing phases were 
well done, the sales and service phase should 
proceed easily. Nevertheless, the final market- 
ing, sales, installation, and ongoing service of a 
product are the activities that should provide the 
validation, acceptance and viability measure- 
ments planned earlier. Further, if the sales and 
service phase is well orchestrated, this will 
substantially lessen the investments necessary for 
subsequent naturalist and marketing phases for 
new products. 
The above measurement-oriented approach 
provides an overall framework for human- 
centred design. Beyond this structure, more 
detailed methodological guidance is needed. 
During the later stages of the marketing phase, 
and throughout the engineering phase, methods 
are needed for synthesizing functionality that 
satisfy requirements within the scope of the 
design goals outlined earlier. 
We have found a five-step method to be 
particularly useful (Rouse, 1988b). This method 
begins by characterizing user-system tasks by 
selecting one or more elements of a taxonomy of 
13 general tasks. The next step involves assessing 
relative demands on tasks, especially to deter- 
mine "bottlenecks". The third step concerns 
identifying approaches to support by mapping 
from high-demand tasks to one or more 
elements of a taxonomy of 17 support concepts. 
The fourth step is determining likely applications 
obstacles for the candidate support concepts 
selected. The last step concerns anticipating user 
acceptance problems by applying a 12-step 
procedure to evaluate support concepts and plan 
their implementation. 
The methodologies outlined in this section 
have been applied to a variety of complex design 
problems, including advanced aircraft cockpits, 
power plant control rooms, several design 
support systems, and a new concept for 
production planning and scheduling. In all of 
these applications, the philosophy, goals, and 
methodologies enabled human-centered design 
issues to predominate, and technological issues 
to be subordinated to the goals of providing 
support for humans. 
In the following sections, experiences in the 
processing and manufacturing industries, as well 
as crosscultural experiences, are used to 
illustrate various aspects of human-centered 
design and also show how many of the principles 
discussed earlier in this paper are manifested in
applications. 
EXPERIENCES IN PROCESS INDUSTRIES 
Fashions 
As with women's and men's clothing, there 
have been and still are dominant fashions in 
process control and automation. The 1960s 
showed a push for on-line quality measurement, 
and on-line computers for the optimization of 
process operation. The 1970s brought small-size 
control rooms with VDU-based instrumentation 
for complete production sites, handled by 
first-class operators in the control rooms, 
assisted by second-class operators in the plant 
areas. The 1980s howed the impact of adaptive 
control, expert systems, and statistical quality 
control. 
Each new wave is advocated as the final 
solution, is pushed into practice, is met by 
difficulties, and finally subsides into a more or 
less stationary outcome. In some cases, e.g. for 
on-line quality measurement, the difficulties are 
mainly of a technical nature, but in others there 
are organizational nd human problems, which 
were (and are) not always clearly recognized 
nor adequately dealt with. Consequently, one 
wonders if all the potential benefits have really 
been reaped. 
Optimization 
As an example, on-line optimization of 
process operation has run into the incom- 
patibility between numerical computation and 
human methods of decision-making and action. 
The process operator associates critical con- 
straints with certain controller setpoints (e.g. 
"Never move temperature 703 about 435 
degrees, otherwise there is excessive coking in 
the flasher!"), and deals with them one at a 
time. As a result, the operator neither 
understands nor accepts the computer output, 
which shows simultaneous corrections to all 
setpoints without indicating relationships of 
these changes to the critical constraints. The 
operator cannot grasp, or at least has doubts, 
that the effect of changing temperature 703 from 
435 to 439 degrees is compensated for by a 
simultaneous increase of flow rate 695 by 0.7%, 
and a decrease of pressure 706 by 0.8 bar, etc. 
Since the operator is still held responsible for 
process upsets, he or she will tend to play safe 
and ignore the computer. 
Optimization procedures generated by com- 
puters have to be brought into a form which is 
familiar and acceptable to the operator. One 
possibility is to develop near-optimal regulatory 
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control structures and decentralized, simplified 
computations, which can also cope with varia- 
tions in process conditions. Then the in-plant 
system needs to be updated only infrequently, 
making this system and its supervisors (the 
operators!) more autonomous. In this way, 
appropriate technical measurements can also 
create opportunities for organizational 
decentralization. 
Co -operation 
A case where co-operation among operators 
was vital was the design of a major extension of 
a petroleum refinery (Pikaar et al., 1985). The 
goal was "whitening the barrel": converting 
cheap heavy fractions into more-valuable ighter 
ones (gasoline, kerosene, light gas oil). For this 
purpose the number of processing plants was to 
be doubled, with many interactions due to 
common energy utility systems. These interac- 
tions would make the refinery very vulnerable to 
local upsets, as these spread rapidly through the 
utility systems and easily infect other plants. 
Consequently, good co-operation between con- 
trol room operators was considered to be 
essential. 
An obvious measure was to ensure eye-to-eye 
contact in the control room over the VDUs on 
the consoles, even between two short (seated) 
operators. This led to the choice of small VDUs 
(13 inch, instead of the more fashionable 19 inch 
models), and shallow keyboards (8 inch). But 
organizational aspects proved to be more 
problematic: the existing subdivision of the 
operator team into two subteams, each with its 
own supervisor, blocked essential communica- 
tion between control room operators. Therefore 
much attention had to be paid to integrating the 
total operator team by setting up common 
training and having common supervisors. It is 
amazing how organizational divisions remain 
visible long after they have lost sense and 
purpose. Evidently, organizational nd psychol- 
ogical problems are much harder to recognize 
and to solve than technical ones, and engineers 
can be quite irrational (in this respect hey prove 
to be as human as other people!). 
Another, unexpected problem appeared when 
individual plants were allocated to the different 
operator positions in the control room. The 
object was to keep process interactions within 
one operator position to the extent possible, and 
to minimize the distance between operators with 
many interactions. The result of this optimiza- 
tion was a semicircle of four operator consoles 
(each with one operator position during normal 
operation, and two operator positions during 
major upsets), with a fifth console in the center. 
The latter proved to be the console for the 
utilities, which caused an uproar in the design 
team: "What? You are going to put those stupid 
utilities in the middle? Unacceptable! Only our 
technologically advanced conversion unit 
deserves that location!" Fortunately, after 
lengthy discussions emotions were replaced by 
reason. Later experience has shown that major 
upsets can be dealt with only by coordination 
from behind the central utilities console. 
A third problem, which became evident from 
observing operator actions during a major upset, 
is the variability of operator workload. During 
normal operation outside office hours, when not 
much is happening and there are no maintenance 
technicians and staff around, control-room 
operators can easily cope with their job. But 
when things go wrong, the workload can become 
excessive. Unfortunately, with an increasing 
degree of automation and centralization, this 
difference tends to become more pronounced. 
(Extreme differences are found in electric power 
generation, where the operator's job consists 
mainly of waiting for emergencies.) Improve- 
ments can be made by training central operators 
to take over some tasks from their neighbours in 
the central control room, and providing them 
with the corresponding displays and controls. 
Small-scale plants 
There is a tendency to transfer work 
organization concepts, as developed in the 
large-scale process industries (oil refineries, bulk 
chemical plants) to smaller plants. These 
concepts work well with "closed" equipment; 
hence operators in a central control room can 
clearly see what happens on the VDU screens 
and other displays. Therefore, they are able to 
direct the work of their field operators, and to 
coordinate the overall operation effectively 
among themselves. 
In contrast, many small-scale plants have 
mostly "open" process equipment. Operators 
have to see directly what is going on, and to 
make local adjustments. Displaying information 
only in the central control room is, therefore, 
insufficient. Similar conditions exist in other 
industries, e.g. papermaking, where setting-up 
the paper machine requires monitoring both of 
the displays in the control room and of the 
conditions in the machine itself. In such cases, 
the concept of the central operator as the "boss" 
of the local operators does not fit. Instead, 
operators function better on equal terms, with 
responsibilities in the control room as well as at 
the process equipment. This easily leads to the 
concept of an autonomous work group with jobs 
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of equal status and an informal internal 
organization (Rijnsdorp et al., 1984). 
Networks 
Like any organization, industrial enterprises 
suffer from a lack of co-ordination and 
communication. Multinationals experience par- 
ticular difficulties, due to their multi-dimensional 
structure: marketing offices distributed over 
various countries, active in different product 
groups; production in other locations, each 
serving several marketing offices; joint ventures 
and co-makerships with other firms, etc. But 
smaller enterprises are not free from problems 
either. There are always conflicts of interest 
between sales, production, purchasing, logistics, 
research and development and maintenance. 
A way to improve communication and 
co-ordination is the computer network. Banks 
have already pioneered this tool with very 
satisfactory results. People in different parts of 
the world with different cultural backgrounds, 
who have never seen each other, interweave 
working together with exchanging jokes! 
The application of networks in industrial 
enterprises i probably not so straightforward. It 
is unlikely that conflicts can be resolved by 
digital data exchanges; meetings and manage- 
ment guidance seem essential here. But compu- 
ter networks could complement direct com- 
munication by providing objective information, 
e.g. "What is the cost of satisfying a very 
demanding customer? What is the best allocation 
of production runs between two factories in 
different countries?" 
Design considerations 
The usual deadlines of plant design projects 
make it almost impossible to pay sufficient 
attention to the interdisciplinary aspects of 
automation. It is therefore desirable to set up an 
anticipatory phase, well ahead of the actual 
project. This phase consists of: 
A situation study in a comparable running 
production plant. Here process automatability 
can be analyzed, and future user needs and 
wishes collected and evaluated. 
Developing a user participation concept. It is 
important to find an efficient and effective way to 
involve future users (or their representatives) in 
the design project, and encourage acceptance by 
lower management and project staff. 
Allocation of tasks. A careful choice must be 
made of the degree of automation for each 
operational function, from plant scheduling to 
off-normal handling. The level of automation 
"intelligence" requires pecial attention, as this 
has an impact on job content and selection 
requirements. 
Structure of the work organization. This 
involves setting goals for organization develop- 
ment, and fitting the work organization to the 
technical and social conditions at hand. 
Job design. Within the framework of the 
chosen work organization, the job content of 
production and other personnel should be 
assessed. If results are negative, task allocation 
and/or work organization are modified 
accordingly. 
Selection, training and career development 
concepts. These should be formalized. 
EXPERIENCES IN MANUFACTURING 
Changing conditions and structures of 
manufacturing 
During the last two decades the markets for 
industrial consumer goods and, consequently, 
those for capital goods have shifted from steady 
expansion towards stagnation. This persistant 
global trend does not yet seem to be affected by 
unsatisfied needs in developing countries. Terms 
of trade and debts hinder these countries, 
preventing them from turning their needs into 
spending power for industrial goods. Thus, at 
least for the forseeable future, the world 
markets are and will remain constrained to the 
highly industrialized areas and "threshold" 
countries comprising North America, western 
Europe and south-east Asia. 
The overall low growth rates of these limited 
markets mean that competition also changes its 
character from supplying expanding market 
shares, where suppliers are usually able to set 
the conditions, to displacing competitors, where- 
by customers gain the power to demand products 
adapted to their needs. Under these new market 
conditions, price and quality of unified products 
are no longer the only important assets. The 
ability to adapt products to customer equire- 
ments for increasing variety, and to guarantee 
short delivery times is becoming a more 
important competitive factor. 
The functional requirements hat follow from 
this market situation are manifold: 
Flexibility of production facilities so that 
various products, even those not yet known, 
can be manufactured. 
Simple and quick resettability of manufactur- 
ing installations in order to allow small lots to 
be manufactured. 
Reassignment of quality assurance functions to 
the productive work stations (i.e. quality must 
not be controlled, but produced). 
Rearrangement of production facilities, based 
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on principles of group manufacturing, in order 
to shorten lead-times. 
Ability of subsystems to work autonomously 
in order to permit investments to be made 
step by step. 
In attempting to meet these requirements, 
there are three substantial economic difficulties 
the factory of today has to contend with. The 
following discussion is based on the German 
machine industry, but also seems to be 
applicable to other countries. 
First, there is a continual increase in capital 
tied up in factory equipment which compels 
management to make better use of it. Second, 
long and varying lead-times caused by the 
functional principle of job-shop manufacturing 
make work in progress expensive. Third, the 
ratio of 144 indirect to 100 direct workers on 
average in the German machine industry causes 
excessive personnel expenses, since well- 
organized firms with comparable products have 
shown that a 90 to 100 ratio is sufficient. Two 
opposing concepts of manufacturing automation 
have emerged to surmount these difficulties. 
Alternative approaches to manufacturing 
automation 
The technocentric approach. This approach 
leaves the basic job-shop structure of the 
production process unchanged and follows the 
same fundamental objectives as in the past. 
These objectives are to reduce direct labor costs 
and to gain better control over the manufactur- 
ing process. Applied to the shop floor, 
management a tempts to automate setting and 
operating functions almost completely for 
machine tools and handling systems. The 
activities focus on automatic part and tool 
changes, measuring devices and monitoring 
systems. They are limited by the increasing costs 
of this equipment. Although fully automatic 
operation might be temporarily possible, human 
operators are still needed. 
This concept of the "unmanned factory" runs 
into several difficulties, making its success 
doubtful. First, the high cost and risk, caused 
particularly by the software needed, are too 
large for many small and medium-sized firms. 
Despite their growing economic importance, 
these small firms would be bypassed by such 
developments. Second, firms following this 
strategy would suffer from relative inflexibility 
regarding alteration of batches and process 
innovation. Third, as a sort of irony of 
automation, flexible manufacturing systems are 
becoming more and more complex and suscep- 
tible to breakdowns because of automation and, 
consequently, increasingly dependent again on 
highly qualified, skilled human labor (Bain- 
bridge, 1982). 
The human-centered approach: skill-based 
manufacturing. As discussed earlier, this ap- 
proach regards automation (and technology in 
general) not as a constraint but an option 
that--when properly designed and applied-- 
provides an oppportunity to see qualified "live 
work" and automated work not as irreconcilable 
contrasts, but as supplementary productive 
forces. Sociologists call this new approach a 
change of paradigm in industrial production. 
The new organizational paradigm 
This human centered or organizational para- 
digm views technology not as a thing but as a 
relationship between people and their artefacts 
(van Beinum, 1988). All technologies are tools 
and have meaning only when being used and 
controlled by people. Introducing a new 
technology means introducing a new relation- 
ship, and managing technological change means 
managing a relationship which is changing. 
Understanding work as a relationship between 
people and their tools takes on a special meaning 
when we consider this relationship on the 
organizational level. 
Organizations are sociotechnical systems. The 
concept of sociotechnical systems design was 
developed thirty years ago by the Tavistock 
Institute. It arose from the consideration that 
any production system requires both a technical 
organization and a social system which creates 
and governs the relations among those who carry 
out the necessary tasks. If we design and manage 
the work situation so that the social system and 
the technical system are interrelated in a highly 
complementary way, we can achieve joint 
optimization of the two systems, and thus of the 
functioning of the organization as a whole. 
In the quest for the proper response to this 
challenge, many companies have attempted over 
the past few years to develop and introduce new 
structures of organization and labor in the 
manufacturing sector under the general heading 
of flexibility. This can be achieved by a structure 
of functional blocks (products in assembly 
groups, production in working groups and 
manufacturing cells or islands) (Ortner, 1988). 
This makes more transparent what goes on in a 
company. Further, if the control and manage- 
ment system is designed in a more decentralized 
way and the staff have proper qualifications, this 
approach allows production planning and prod- 
uction control functions to be moved back to the 
operations level. This results in shorter and 
faster decision making pathways and fewer 
hierarchical steps. 
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Delegating to groups further activities uch as 
setting-up, programming, repair, maintenance 
and quality assurance further improves flexibi- 
lity. The added personnel cost arising as a 
consequence of needing more qualified staff is 
balanced by increasing utilization of systems. In 
order to be able to process orders quickly 
enough, manufacturing plants will in this way 
increasingly assume the character of service 
companies. 
This new organizational concept has recently 
been shown to be highly successful both in 
small-lot production, e.g. in the machine 
building industry, and in the automobile 
industry, which--except in Sweden--used to be 
organized strictly along the lines of Henry Ford. 
The case of Felten & Guilleaume (F&G) 
In 1985, the Nordenham works of F&G had 
567 employees producing low voltage switch gear 
and accessories and electric motors. They faced 
serious problems typical of so many similar 
operators: sales stagnated, life span of products 
became shorter (as did delivery times), lots 
became smaller, cost reduction on the labor side 
through further automation seemed infeasible. 
They realized that their problems could not be 
solved by technical means only and decided to 
restructure manufacturing and information syst- 
ems. They started with one part of the 
mechanical workshop, assigning the following 
tasks to the "production island": setting of 
machines and tools, manufacturing the prod- 
ucts, stock-keeping of raw materials including 
replenishing, routine maintenance work, quality 
inspection and recording, and work planning 
within a time-span of one week. 
After one and a half years, the results were 
convincing, e.g. throughput times were cut by 
half, output per capita had gone up 25% and the 
workforce was proud of their work. This 
encouraged the firm to restructure the whole 
mechanical workshop and the assembly depart- 
ments as well. 
Since the island principle had worked so well 
on the shop floor, they were tempted to apply 
the same principle to clerical work in ad- 
ministration where they had similar problems 
with long chains between customer, sales, 
product design, tool design, production planning 
etc. They therefore installed "administration 
islands" in one room to speed up and improve 
their tending services. Again, speed, quality and 
self-teaching team effects were overwhelming. 
The next steps are to restructure materials 
management and production control. 
Automated machinery and computers were 
also used, of course, but--as one manager put 
it--"Wherever computer application threatens 
to become a self-contained, self-absorbed busi- 
ness it should be fought like the plague!" 
Design considerations 
The findings experienced both in the process 
industries and in manufacturing correlate re- 
markably well. Sociotechnical design considera- 
tions which may be derived are: 
Importance of overall work structure 
Team approach with job rotation (so opera- 
tors can replace each other) 
Maximum possible degree of automation ot 
necessarily being the optimum 
Importance of (re)qualification f operators 
Great difficulty with innovation within the 
organization (changing traditional roles and 
privileges) 
Transformation of computer outputs (interac- 
tions) into forms that fit human criteria 
New technologies favouring/encouraging more 
holistic work contents (tasks) and decentral- 
ized structures (local autonomy) 
Autonomous work groups especially needed 
in smaller plants, and possibly appropriate 
everywhere. 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF AUTOMATION 
In industrial organizations economic aspects of 
automation are considered a part of the business 
activity. The purpose of the business unit is to 
satisfy the needs of individual consumers, other 
enterprises, or society as a whole. Sufficient 
profitability and balanced cash flow are essential 
for the existence of the business unit in the long 
term. 
Decision-makers esponsible for allocation of 
financial resources in different business activities 
are first of all interested in the efficient use of 
invested capital. The common practical measure 
is return on investment (ROI). Lower-level 
managers responsible for the production process 
have to decide how to use available financial 
resources. The basic reason to develop automa- 
tion may be economic, technical, human or 
environmental, but in practice the responsibility 
of the manager is to make technically feasible 
and economically sound decisions which satisfy 
all the requirements for which he or she is 
responsible. 
Such decisions can be easy if costs and 
performance of technology are deterministic and 
can be measured in monetary terms. However, 
traditional financial measures---like ROI--are 
not well suited when considering attributes 
which cannot be evaluated in monetary terms, 
such as flexibility, acceptance of the work 
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system, or the impact of technologies on the 
company's long-term competitive position. 
Human and cultural aspects present even 
greater difficulties. 
In recent years, methods have been 
developed----e.g, by Grob (1983)--that allow for 
consideration of nonmonetary attributes, in 
investment decisions. While this topic cannot be 
pursued in this paper, it is useful to note that, in 
general, decision-makers must learn to take into 
account qualitative long-term strategic 
considerations. 
CULTURAL ASPECTS OF AUTOMATION 
In developing countries, machines are expen- 
sive and people are cheap. In contrast, machines 
are often inexpensive relative to people in the 
developed nations. This difference is crucial 
when we consider appropriate technology. The 
key question is the meaning of the word 
"appropriate". As we are trading more and 
more with third world and nonwestern ations, 
the meaning of this word is becoming less and 
less clear. 
It is inevitable that the pressure of interna- 
tional competition sets equal standards for the 
unequal? Are there no ways for viewing tasks 
within cultural contexts? Basic technologies are 
universal, but is it possible to have different 
implementations and applications of technology 
which consider specific cultural and economic 
needs? 
In this section, we raise issues which go far 
beyond traditional areas of engineering. 
Nevertheless, control engineers who quite often 
accelerate the unemployment rate with their 
artefacts hould also play their part in solving 
global problems. 
Culture and technology 
An issue which has been largely neglected by 
technologists for many decades is how amenable 
a particular culture is to the technology which is 
being introduced to it--or,  in many cases, 
imposed upon it. It has been recognized by 
observers in African states, for example, 
that--as tough as it might appear politically to 
say it--in practice it probably takes two to three 
generations to change cultural values towards 
new technology, or to implement the subsequent 
absorption of this technology. The experience of 
many educators is that while it would be 
desirable to train a whole generation of 
engineers as rapidly as possible, this has proven 
to be impossible in practice. 
In most African states one finds, for example, 
that only now are indigenously-trained ngineers 
emerging, and that typically these have come 
from families whose parents have at least some 
technological background. Also, the grandpar- 
ents were often school teachers or at least had 
some introduction to science or technology. 
Simply to impose a technology on a society and 
believe that it will be able to cope through 
extensive training has been proven not to work. 
It has led to rejection of technology or, in the 
case of colonized countries, has simply become 
part of the colonialist strategy. 
These comments are made on the basis of 
engineering. However, when one considers for 
example that many so-called "underdeveloped" 
countries do not even have a language which is 
"numeric", then one can realize the scope of 
the problem of introducing new technological 
concepts! (A "numeric" language is one which 
contains inherent concepts of numbers and 
arithmetic functions.) 
In addition to problems of language and 
numerics, another aspect of culture which must 
be considered in terms of introducing a new 
technology is the fundamental attitude of that 
culture towards labor and service. A proud 
culture, which has always been violently 
independent, will have great difficulty in 
absorbing technology which demands a large 
degree of adherence to sets of rigid rules. Again, 
one can look at the example of many third 
world countries in which stable nations were 
subjected to the imposition of colonialism which 
in many cases depended upon master-slave 
relationships. As part of these structures, the 
"masters" insisted on the "slaves" doing certain 
tasks which were essentially to the well-being of 
the colonialists, but were denigrating to a 
culturally proud people. For example, in many 
African tribes manual work was traditionally not 
done by men. However, in many parts of central 
and southern Africa the colonialists persuaded 
men to do manual tasks--even including 
housework, previously totally reserved for 
females. Now with decolonization it is little 
wonder that one of the first things which goes is 
any form of rigidly-structured manual work. It is 
no surprise that the previously proud culture 
reacts and wants to attempt o return to the state 
of freedom ! 
What can one conclude about eastern 
cultures? Again it is difficult to draw any rigid 
guidelines. However, if one looks at the 
"service culture" characteristics of Japan, one 
sees some interesting concepts emerging. 
For many years we have been bombarded by 
the fact that Japan appears to maintain a low 
unemployment rate. While recent studies have 
pointed to the fact that this might not continue, 
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it cannot be denied that Japan still has one of the 
highest employment rates in the world. This is 
true despite the fact that Japan has always been 
pointed to as the major consumer of automation. 
Of course, the concept of countries, such as 
Japan, exporting unemployment is well-known 
and there can be little doubt that the result of 
Japanese high efficiency in manufacturing has 
been the creation of unemployment i  countries 
who simply cannot compete. 
Many of us have also been intrigued for years 
by what the Japanese actually mean when they 
state that they are creating a service industry. If 
one looks at the UK or Europe, one sees great 
difficulties with the proposed involvement of 
more and more people in the so-called "service" 
industries. Indeed, if one looks at the European 
scene, one sees that most people have some sort 
of hang-up about serving their fellow human 
beings! Indeed, in third world circumstances, 
including many ex-colonies, the whole concept 
of service is looked on with much suspicion-- 
largely as a result of the master-servant 
relationships created by the colonists. 
Although things are changing, the Japanese 
tradition of service is extremely strong and still 
exists. Their culture has had a unique ability to 
absorb other cultures, other religions and other 
concepts. Despite such changes, they continue as 
a unified whole, maintaining the concept of 
service as a critical one. This is not just related 
to service to one company. Indeed many 
industrial observers have commented on the fact 
that the present loyalty to one single employer 
will probably change in the next few decades and 
is already changing to some extent. 
However, the concept of service goes much 
further. The ticket inspector, for example, is 
respected by all whom he or she serves. The 
young lady who opens the lift doors perennially 
has a smile, and seems to find a great deal of 
satisfaction just doing her job properly. The 
person going around a hotel in Tokyo, checking 
that any marks on the floor have been removed 
and that all pieces of furniture are in order does 
this with much pride. As an outsider to the 
culture, of course, one cannot even hope to fully 
understand the motivations for these ideas. 
However, one observes that the concept is still 
very strong. 
Cultural impact on automation 
The question is, how do all the cultural issues 
discussed above affect automation? It has been 
claimed by many that automation has two prime 
effects. One is that it undoubtedly puts people 
out of work--in terms of traditional, manual 
labor. This appears to be attractive in that it 
might suit, for example, African countries to 
revert to a situation where the jobs in the 
factories are all high level and no menial tasks 
are required. However, the problem with this is 
that the new tasks which have been introduced 
require a high degree of training. Since, as 
mentioned previously, it takes several gener- 
ations to produce competent engineers, the 
pattern which is seen throughout decolonized 
Africa, where high-technology industries imply 
do not survive, seems inevitable. 
The other side of automation is the claim that 
its consequences are improvement in the earning 
power of a country which can, in turn, support 
many service functions. Again the Japanese 
example is worth looking at. 
In discussion with Japanese industrialists, it
appears that the intention is still to decrease the 
human content of their operation. Most 
companies state publicly that they wish to make 
more use of machines, and more use of 
computer-integrated manufacturing. They aim to 
lower the number of people required. This is 
against a background of operations such as 
watch-manufacturing lines, producing over 
100000 quartz crystal watches per week, and 
currently manned by 5 or 6 people, or complete 
flexible manufacturing systems, with up to 10 
machine tools attached, having single operators 
who not only ensure that the system keeps 
running but also load up the pallets, adjust the 
workpieces, etc. Despite this the companies say 
that they wish to go further. 
Observers are nevertheless truck by the fact 
that more and more people really do seem to be 
used in the service industry, not just in serving 
food, but on the railways, in farming, etc. In the 
busiest of Tokyo train stations, where over one 
million people pass through the barriers every 
day, the Japanese are not (as of this writing) 
using automatic ticket machines uch as those 
currently being introduced on the London 
Underground. On entering the station, one's 
ticket is clipped by one inspector, and it is taken 
when one leaves by another. The stations 
themselves are supervised by many workers who 
ensure people get into the over-full Tokyo 
trains. There are always enough ticket windows 
open to buy tickets, and always omeone around 
to give you directions. 
Farming is still on a small scale, despite the 
tremendous demand. Japan imports vast amo- 
unts of its food, and yet large percentages of the 
land are turned over to agriculture. No attempt 
seems to be made towards automation here, and 
peasant farming still appears to be the order of 
the day. Throughout he countryside one sees 
families busy tilling the fields or their rice 
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paddies. Occasionally tractors are used, but in 
many cases very simple, primitive farming 
methods are employed. 
How does this all work? Somewhere within 
the Japanese structure there seems to be some 
careful planning to determine what can be 
automated--where the value can be added to a 
product. This planning takes place in the context 
of a clear recognition that it is essential to 
provide people with some form of employment, 
even though, in certain cases, particularly for 
internal consumption, it might appear to be 
more economical to automate. 
However, in the African situation with a 
completely different approach to the service 
industry, one is left with tremendous problems. 
The concept of service held by a significant 
percentage of the population has been distorted 
by the colonialist days, and service is seen as 
being degrading. The concept, then, of moving 
employment further into the service sector is 
highly questionable. 
These comments are made by technologists 
and not by sociologists. The point is that the two 
should get together to try to resolve the 
difficulties. This could mean, on one hand, 
developing and applying technologies appropri- 
ately within a particular culture. On the other 
this might mean helping a culture to utilize the 
possible benefits of technology without involun- 
tarily giving up cultural values. Such endeavors 
will remain fruitless in the case of most 
under developed countries, as long as the 
western understanding of these cultures remains 
minimal and in many cases naive. One of the 
characteristics of our era is still the arrogance of 
one culture over another, particularly when the 
first culture is one which is technologically-based 
and, therefore, has strength through this 
technology. 
Work ing group on cultural aspects o f  automat ion 
As a result of the IFAC discussions between 
proponents of social effects research and 
human-machine systems, an increased aware- 
ness has grown that these two approaches may 
require a third supplementary focus on culture. 
It has been suggested that it would be a unique 
contribution if a learned technical institution like 
IFAC took the initiative in promoting an 
understanding of the larger pattern of conse- 
quences based on its own professional en- 
deavors, and considering all its complexities. 
The Technical Board of IFAC has therefore just 
established the Working Group on Cultural 
Aspects of Automation within the Social Effects 
Committee. Its scope is to promote understand- 
ing of the interplay between technological 
development, social conditions and effects, and 
cultural change; to explore new approaches for 
cross-disciplinary research; and to develop and 
transfer views and methodologies that include 
cultural aspects to control engineers and 
interdisciplinary groups dealing with automation 
systems design. 
CONCLUSION 
If we wish engineering artefacts to be 
reconciled with broader aspects of life, we must 
consider comprehensive sets of requirements in 
engineering design. Ignoring any impact that an 
innovation might have on the environment, or 
the people in the environment, will be seen by 
history as being negligent. Of course, certain 
effects will have to be accepted, but we must, 
together with a wide cross-section of the people 
affected, investigate all aspects before positive 
decisions are made. 
In view of the enormous effects of automation 
technology on both the private sphere and the 
world at large, technocentric thinking that 
rejects comprehensive technology assessment 
should be abandoned. It is also important to 
recognize that a large number of examples have 
shown how a holistic approach to automation 
design will result in systems with improved 
overall performance. Not only do the resulting 
systems work better, but they are better for the 
world in which we all l ive--now and in the 
future. 
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